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Introduction 
The optimism that characterized the first years following the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s soon gave way for 
a gloomier outlook on the democratic development around the globe. Nearly 30 states – 
most of them new states – had dumped communism, and not even half of them have 
established democratic political systems. Instead, the most frequent result of the fall of 
communism has not been transitions to democracy, but rather transitions from 
communism to other types of non-democratic rule. A substantial number of countries in 
other corners of the world that embarked on transitions from authoritarian rule in the 
wake of what have been labeled “the third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991) 
also experienced an initial period of liberalization and democratization followed by 
change in a more authoritarian direction. A defining feature of this development is that 
many countries that embarked on transitions from authoritarian rule during the last 
decades have established a new form of political system – the hybrid regime – where 
formal democratic institutions such as multiparty elections coexist with a political reality 
characterized by authoritarian practices and frequent abuses of state resources.  
 This paper sets out to discuss two main issues related to the global trend of 
hybridization of political regimes. In the first part of the paper, the concept of hybrid 
regimes is examined. With the assistance of available indexes and data sources an attempt 
to single out the hybrid regimes of the world is carried out. The second part of the paper 
examines some of the theoretical explanations of the global spread of hybrid regimes that 
might be found in the thus far quite limited literature on the subject. Some thoughts about 
the usefulness of earlier research on democratic transition and consolidation for empirical 
analyses of hybrid regimes are also presented.  
 
The recent trend of hybridization 
By the mid 1990s, the share of electoral democracies in the world was more than 60 
percent, compared to only less than 30 percent in 1974, when the “third wave” took off 
(Diamond 2005). Since then, however, the spread of democratic governance has slowed 
down significantly. Summing up the democratic development during the last decade, two 
broad trends may be identified (Diamond 2005). The first trend is that there has been a 
 1
relative stability regarding democracy as a system of government throughout the world. 
This has been the case in two ways. First, the number of democracies has been relatively 
stable since 1995. Second, although many democracies perform very poorly, few outright 
democratic breakdowns have occurred.  
 The second noticeable trend is that a significant number of the countries that in the 
past decade have moved away from different types of authoritarianism have not 
transformed into democracies, but have rather descended into ambiguous regimes that 
combine democratic and non-democratic characteristics, where formally democratic 
political institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, masks the reality of 
authoritarian domination and informal practices (Diamond 2002; 2005; Reich 2002). 
Some of the most obvious examples of this regime type may be found among the post-
Soviet countries. After a short period of democratic optimism following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus transformed from fledging new 
democracies to increasingly authoritarian practices. This tendency is not in any way a 
unique post-communist feature, however. Under the demagogic hand of Hugo Chavez, 
Venezuela has been heading in the same direction during the 2000s. Numerous other 
examples might be found in Africa and Asia as well (cf. Ottaway 2003; Levitsky & Way 
2002; Carothers 2002).  
 Thus, the third wave of democratization did not only result in a worldwide spread of 
liberal democracy, but also in the growth of a form of government, an intermediate 
regime category which today represent the modal type of political regime in the 
developing world (Schedler 2006b, 3). In fact, the most frequent type of regime transition 
in the period 1945 to 1998 was not from authoritarianism to democracy – which might be 
an impression one gets when consulting the massive literature on democratization – but 
from authoritarian rule to semi-democracy of some kind (Reich 2002). It is also 
noticeable that transitions from semi-democracy to authoritarianism have been almost as 
frequent as transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, but have not received much 
attention within the field of comparative democratization. The data presented in table 1 
indicates that the phenomenon of regimes combining democratic and authoritarian 
elements is not entirely new. In the 1960s and 1970s examples of electoral authoritarian 
regimes could be found in Mexico, South Africa, Singapore and Malaysia. 
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Table 1. Regime transitions, 1945–98 
Type of transition Frequency Per cent 
Authoritarian to democracy 46 22.4 
Semi-democracy to democracy 15 7.3 
Authoritarian to semi-democracy 62 30.2 
Democracy to semi-democracy 8 3.9 
Semi-democracy to authoritarian 42 20.5 
Democracy to authoritarian 32 15.6 
Total 205 100 
Source: Reich (2002, 12). 
 
The number of hybrid regimes escalated after the demise of Soviet style communism, an 
event which was one of the most important triggers of this development. During the Cold 
War many governments rejected liberal democracy outright in the name of “people’s 
democracy” or in the name of cultural traditions that precluded the egoistic individualism 
they saw liberal democracy based on. The end of the Cold War meant a dramatic change 
in this outlook. Today, few governments and intellectuals are officially defending non-
democratic types of government. Even old autocrats feel the need to at least pretend 
devotion to the concept of democracy, often for the sake of international legitimacy and 
the possibility to receive economic support from the advanced democracies. Many 
governments, however, are not willing to totally accept the limitations on the extent and 
duration of their power imposed by democracy. As a result, an increasing number of 
governments have established formally democratic institutions, which the incumbents 
often try to circumvent in their efforts to remain in power (Ottaway 2003, 4). Later on, 
the question about the factors behind this trend will be discussed.  
 
Hybrid regimes and diminished subtypes of democracy 
Despite the fact that the last decades have seen the rise of a substantial number of regimes 
that combine free multiparty elections with varying degrees of autocracy, this 
development has received surprisingly little attention from the scholarly community. One 
reason for this might be the “democratic bias” that has come to dominate comparative 
democratization studies. From the perspective of democratization theory, the worldwide 
proliferation of hybrid regimes was viewed by and large as setbacks in the global wave of 
democratization. These regimes – for example Russia, Georgia and Zimbabwe – were 
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viewed and categorized as cases of “defective democracy”, “pseudo democracy”, 
“illiberal democracy”, “guided democracy”, and even “authoritarian democracy”, i.e. 
what Collier and Levitsky (1997) have called “democracy with adjectives”. They were 
generally described as going through “stucked”, “flawed” or “protracted” transitions to 
democracy. Thus, by and large, regimes mixing democratic and authoritarian features 
have been regarded as democracies that demonstrate different types of shortcomings. 
These characterizations assume that hybrid regimes are moving in a democratic direction, 
which is a misleading assumption that lack empirical support (Carothers 2002; Levitsky 
& Way 2008). 
 There has been no agreement among scholars on central issues such as the defining 
features of this type of polity, and what term to use when describing it. Lately, 
comparative research on post-authoritarian countries has come to focus heavily on the 
“quality of democracy”, i.e. the benchmarking of institutions against an ideal form of 
democracy. However, the notion of “quality of democracy” and diminished subtypes of 
democracy lose its validity when applied to regimes that even fail to live up to minimal 
democratic standards and norms (Schedler 2006; cf. Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007). If we 
are dealing with political regimes that do not meet minimal democratic standards we 
should logically not treat them as democracies, but rather as instances of a different type 
of regime. Here, as a starting point, the term “hybrid regimes” is proposed as a generic 
term for characterizing regimes that combine different types of democratic and non-
democratic features. 
 If there is an abundance of different terms seeking to describe this type of political 
system, i.e. “democracy with adjectives”, the same cannot be said about systematic 
conceptualizations and classifications. Most empirical studies have been qualitative and 
have focused on one or a few cases drawing only implicit comparisons (e.g. Way 2002; 
Way 2005; Schedler 2006a). The few ambitious attempts made to systematically define 
and conceptualize the phenomenon have not been very parsimonious, with long 
checklists along different dimensions (e.g. Wigell 2008), making operationalization a 
difficult task considering the quite substantial number of countries that might come into 
question. Moreover, such attempts often take definitions of democracy as their departure. 
Theoretically, the notion of a diminished form of authoritarianism, or “semi-
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authoritarianism” might be a better starting point when trying to characterize this regime 
type (Ottaway 2003; Guliyev 2005). The obsession with democracy and democratization 
within contemporary comparative politics may be one reason to account for the lack of 
broader systematic comparative studies of hybrid regimes.1 It may also partially explain 
the tendency to define hybrid regimes in negative terms. It is often stated that hybrid 
regimes are neither democratic, nor completely authoritarian regimes, i.e. they are a 
different type of polity. Such findings do not provide an answer to the important question 
about what constitute these differences.  
 Modern democratization theory and “transitology” have often been criticized for 
employing too narrow, or minimalist, conceptions of democracy. One consequence of 
this, according to the critics, has been that many countries that do not meet several 
democratic standards still are defined as democracies, as long as they perform regular 
elections with universal suffrage, i.e. “free elections”. This critique is in many cases 
misplaced, however.2 In mainstream democratization research, Dahl’s conception of 
“polyarchy” has been the dominant definition. Thus, comparative democratization has 
relied on a robust, though procedural, definition of democracy that perceives not only 
free and fair elections, but also a number of political and civil freedoms that make the 
elections truly meaningful, as necessary conditions for democracy (Diamond 2002, 21). 
Despite this, many countries have political systems that live up to the procedural 
requirements, but where the citizens’ political rights are violated in different ways (cf. 
Schedler 2002). Some scholars have tried to overcome this ambiguity and also issues of 
operationalization by relying on even more procedural and minimal definitions of 
democracy. However, also a definition of democracy as a system where “its most 
powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic 
elections in which candidates freely compete for votes” (Huntington 1991, 7) generates 
complicated questions about classification. The question about fair and honest elections is 
a critical issue in point. It is not always easy to decide what constitutes fair, honest and 
                                                 
1 A very welcome comparative contribution is the forthcoming book Competitive Authoritarianism: The 
Emergence and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era by Steven Levitsky and Lucan 
Way, which applies a broad comparative perspective, covering five regions: the Americas, Central Europe, 
the former Soviet Union, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2 Transitology has also been criticized for putting too much emphasis on the legitimizing function of 
elections, while downplaying the role of civil society and ordinary citizens in the process of democratic 
consolidation and legitimization.   
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free elections. As Diamond (2002, 22) notes, how could we decide if parties have had a 
fair chance in electoral campaigns and that those entitled to vote have been able to 
exercise their will freely, and that the results have not been manipulated? Of course, these 
questions have always been relevant, but have become even more so in recent years, 
when more regimes than ever before have adopted formal democratic institutions (the 
form of democracy), but fail when it comes to living up to minimal democratic standards. 
Non-democratic rulers have a long menu to choose from when it comes to manipulation 
of the political playing field (Schedler 2002, Case 2006; Hartlyn & McCoy 2006). 
 Assessing the fairness or manipulation of elections is a tricky business (cf. Hartlyn & 
McCoy 2006), and so is the task of defining hybrid regimes. One of the most ambitious 
attempts is provided by Levitsky and Way in their 2002 article “The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism”, which they argue is a more specific and illustrating term than the 
broad concept of hybrid regimes.3 In their definition of competitive authoritarianism 
(CA), Levitsky and Way point to the fact that this type of regime must be distinguished 
first and foremost from democracy, but also from “classical” authoritarian regimes:4 
 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal 
means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to 
such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. 
Examples include Croatia under Franjo Tudjman, Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, Russia under 
Vladimir Putin, Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, and 
post-1995 Haiti, as well as Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, and Zambia through 
much of the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52).  
 
To distinguish CA regimes from democracies, Levitsky and Way argue that although 
democracies from time to time violate the criteria of polyarchy, “such violations are not 
broad or systematic enough to seriously impede democratic challenges to incumbent 
governments” (2002, 53). In CA regimes, by contrast, these criteria are violated in such 
way as to create such an unfair game between regime and oppositional forces that it is not 
                                                 
3 Quite illustrative for the wealth of different terms in this field of research, Schedler (2006b) uses the term 
“electoral authoritarianism” more or less as a synonym to “competitive authoritarianism”. As their title 
suggests, Levitsky and Way (2008) use “competitive authoritarianism” and “hybrid regime” 
interchangeably. I will use the term “hybrid regimes”, due to the fact that this type of regime mixes 
democratic and authoritarian characteristics.  
4 For an overview of “classical” authoritarian regimes, see Linz (2000); Linz & Stepan (1996); Brooker 
(2000).  
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possible to talk about democracy in terms of electoral fairness and respect for political 
and civil rights:  
 
Although elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely 
abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and 
their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and 
other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition 
may be jailed, exiled, or – less frequently – even assaulted or murdered. Regimes characterized by such 
abuses cannot be called democratic (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53).  
 
In sum, CA regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions are 
viewed as the primary means of access to political power, but in which civil liberties 
violations, fraud, and abuse of state resources and media are so significant to skew the 
playing field to the extent that the regime cannot be seen as democratic. Such regimes are 
competitive, in that democratic institutions is not only a façade, but they are authoritarian 
in that opposition forces are held back by a highly uneven and dangerous playing field 
(Levitsky & Way 2008). Democratic institutions do have some real importance and there 
exist arenas for political contestation, although not fair, where the opposition may 
challenge, or even defeat, the authoritarian government. “As a result, even though 
democratic institutions may be badly flawed, both authoritarian incumbents and their 
opponents must take them seriously” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). In addition to these 
political characteristics, citizens in hybrid regimes are often plagued by high levels of 
corruption among officials and bad governance in general. 
 
 
Assessing available data sources and the question of measurement 
Having briefly sketched the characteristics of the hybrid regime type, we now turn to the 
questions about operationalization and possible data sources that may facilitate empirical 
analysis. If we want to use regime type as a variable in cross-national comparative 
analyses, we have to come up with some way to classify and order different types of 
regimes.  
 A central issue in the literature on political regimes concerns the question if 
democracy and other regime types should be treated as dichotomous or continuous 
measurements, or even as intermediate categories (Collier & Adcock 1999; Elkins 2000; 
Hadenius & Teorell 2005; Munck 2006). The debate has focused on empirical analyses of 
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democracy, but is of course equally central in empirical studies of all types of political 
regimes, such as hybrid regimes (cf. Munck 2006; Reich 2002). For example, in a series 
of publications, Adam Przeworski and associates have argued that democracy is an 
either/or phenomenon and that the practice of using intermediate categories to measure 
differences between democratic and non-democratic regimes is nothing short of absurd 
(Alvarez et al. 1996, 21; Przeworski et al. 2000; cf. Elkins 2000, 293).5 Other scholars, 
such as David Collier and Robert Adcock (1999), take a more pragmatic stance, arguing 
that the choice between dichotomous and graded measures should depend on what we 
intend to use them for. Collier and Adcock’s pragmatic approach rejects the idea that 
there is a single correct meaning for all concepts. They oppose the widely held view that 
scholars face a choice between generating dichotomous and continuous measures, a view 
they believe is one of the main obstacles to developing improved measures of political 
regimes.  
 Gerardo Munck argues that the supposedly critical choice between regarding a 
phenomenon in terms of distinctions of “kind” and of “degree” is based on a false 
dilemma fallacy that “originates in a failure to grasp a deceptively simple point: the most 
basic decision in measurement, the drawing of a boundary that establishes an 
equivalence/difference relationship, underlies each and every level of measurement that 
could possibly be used in constructing a scale” (Munck 2006, 29). All measures involve 
classifications that distinguish between cases that are relatively similar to and different 
from other cases in terms of some category. This is a critical point when it comes to grasp 
why we do not have to choose between dichotomous and continuous measures and why 
more advanced, higher-level measures is preferable if available (Munck 2006; cf. Elkins 
2000). 
 A real world outlook also points in favor of including intermediate categories, instead 
of the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy. Regime transitions and consolidation are 
complex and often drawn out processes and countries undergoing transitions may very 
well end up as neither democratic nor authoritarian for a long time. The very notion of 
hybrid regimes suggests that political regime is a phenomenon that may vary both in kind 
                                                 
5 Applying Przeworski’s (1991, 10) catchy definition of democracy as a “political system in which parties 
lose elections”, all countries of interest in this paper should be considered democratic.  
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and degree and I will use it first as a category in order to distinguish between different 
types of regimes, e.g. democratic and non-democratic. Regime types could also be 
classified on an ordinal scale. For example, democracies could be considered to be more 
democratic than hybrid regimes, which in turn are less authoritarian than autocratic 
regimes. Freedom House’s classification of regimes as “free”, “partly free” and “not free” 
is a good case in point (Table 2). Indexes such as Freedom House also make it possible to 
treat political regime as a continuous variable. The Freedom House index of political 
rights and civil liberties is not the only available option however. Some of the indexes 
and classifications that may be found in the literature will now be discussed. 
 
Assessing some available data sources 
Starting from the notion that hybrid regimes are non-democratic political systems where 
democratic procedures are not meaningless, and opposition groups take them seriously as 
arenas through which they may compete for power, a substantial number of countries 
attract our attention. If we turn to Freedom House’s 2007 survey – where regimes are 
classified as “free”, “partly free” or “not free” – 60 countries (31 per cent) are classified 
as “partly free”, i.e.an intermediate category consisting of regimes where the respect for 
political rights and civil liberties are limited in some way, but not totally absent (Table 2). 
It is a very diverse group of countries, covering all regions of the world except Western 
Europe and North America. The Freedom House index has extensive coverage, 
classifying the world’s countries annually since 1972, which makes it an excellent choice 
for quantitative analyses over time. 
  
Table 2. Freedom in the world 2007 according to Freedom House 
Type of regime No. of countries % of countries % of world population 
Free 90 47 46 
Partly free 60 31 18 
Not Free 43 22 36 
Source: Freedom House (2008). 
 
Even though the Freedom House data perform fairly well in an initial phase to identify 
political regimes that blend democratic and autocratic features in various degrees, it 
should nevertheless be complemented with alternative data sources. The group of “partly 
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free” countries is very wide-ranging and includes clearly autocratic countries like Kuwait, 
a traditional monarchy where the royal family dominates political life. At the same time it 
excludes for example Russia, which constitutionally could be seen as an electoral regime, 
but nevertheless is classified as “not free”.  
 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (2006) could also serve as an 
interesting source of data. This index covers 167 political systems in the world (27 micro-
states are excluded) and is based on ratings for 60 indicators, grouped into five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; 
political participation; and political culture. Each of these categories is rated on a 0–10 
scale. Thus, five sub-indexes are actually produced.6 From the scores of the five 
categories, an overall score is produced by dividing the sum by the number of categories. 
The countries covered by the Economist’s democracy index are then classified into four 
types of political regimes, of which one is in fact labeled hybrid regimes, consisting of 30 
countries (Table 3).  
  
Table 3. Index of democracy 2006 by regime type 
Type of regime No. of countries % of countries % of world population 
Full democracies 28 16.8 13.0 
Flawed democracies 54 32.3 38.3 
Hybrid regimes 30 18.0 10.5 
Authoritarian regimes 55 32.9 38.2 
Source: Economist (2007). 
 
The Full democracies category (index ratings above 8) includes old, consolidated 
democracies like Sweden, Iceland, Netherlands, and Norway. Flawed democracies 
(ratings from 6 to 7.9) include e.g. South Africa, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan and most 
post-communist countries in Central Europe. The hybrid regimes (ratings between 4 and 
5.9) cover among others Russia, Venezuela, Mozambique and Turkey. Finally, we have 
the authoritarian regimes (ratings below 4). Countries like Libya, Turkmenistan and 
North Korea obviously belong here, but the category also includes Kuwait, Sierra Leone 
and Morocco, i.e. states that Freedom House designated as “partly free” the same year 
(2006). Overall, however, the Economist index is strongly correlated to other frequently 
                                                 
6 For additional information about definitions, construction of the indexes and coding, see 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_index_2007_v3.pdf  
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used democracy indexes, such as the Freedom House scales (FH civil liberties, Pearson’s 
r = –.911, FH political rights r = –.903, p<0.001) 7 and Polity IV (r = .858, p<0.001). 
 The list of hybrid regimes according to the Economist index, together with their 
respective scores on the sub-indexes, is presented in Table 4.  
  
Table 4. Hybrid regimes in the world according to the Economist index (2006) 
       
 Overall  
score 
Electoral 
process 
Functioning 
of 
government 
Political 
participation 
Political 
culture 
Civil  
liberties 
       
       
       
Albania 5.91 7.33 5.07 4.44 5.63 7.06 
Singapore 5.89 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35 
Madagascar 5.82 5.67 5.71 5.56 6.88 5.29 
Lebanon 5.82 7.92 2.36 6.11 6.25 6.47 
Bosnia 5.78 8.25 3.29 4.44 5.00 7.94 
Turkey 5.70 7.92 6.79 4.44 3.75 5.59 
Nicaragua 5.68 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35 
Thailand 5.67 4.83 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47 
Fiji 5.66 6.50 5.21 3.33 5.00 8.24 
Ecuador 5.64 7.83 4.29 5.00 3.13 7.94 
Venezuela 5.42 7.00 3.64 5.56 5.00 5.88 
Senegal 5.37 7.00 5.00 3.33 5.63 5.88 
Ghana 5.35 7.42 4.64 4.44 4.38 5.88 
Mozambique 5.28 5.25 5.71 4.44 6.88 4.12 
Zambia 5.25 5.25 4.64 3.33 6.25 6.76 
Liberia 5.22 7.75 2.14 5.00 5.63 5.59 
Tanzania 5.18 6.00 3.93 5.06 5.63 5.29 
Uganda 5.14 4.33 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.76 
Kenya 5.08 4.33 4.29 5.56 6.25 5.00 
Russia 5.02 7.00 3.21 5.56 3.75 5.59 
Malawi 4.97 6.00 5.00 3.89 4.38 5.59 
Georgia 4.90 7.92 1.79 3.33 5.00 6.47 
Cambodia 4.77 5.58 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41 
Ethiopia 4.72 4.00 3.93 5.00 6.25 4.41 
Burundi 4.51 4.42 3.29 3.89 6.25 4.71 
Gambia 4.39 4.00 4.64 4.44 5.63 3.24 
Haiti 4.19 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.50 6.47 
Armenia 4.15 4.33 3.21 3.89 3.13 6.18 
Kyrgyzstan 4.08 5.75 1.86 2.78 5.00 5.00 
Iraq 4.01 4.75 0.00 5.56 5.63 4.12 
       
 
Source: Economist (2006). 
 
Hybrid regimes are to be found in almost every corner of the world, except for North 
America and Western Europe. There is also a large amount of variation within and across 
                                                 
7 The negative sign is an effect of Freedom House’s reversed scale, where 1 is most democratic and 7 least 
democratic. 
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the different sub-categories. For example, Bosnia and Nicaragua score above 8 on the 
dimension of the electoral process, while Ethiopia and Gambia come in at 4.00.  
 The inclusion of political participation and political culture in the conceptualization 
of democracy sets this index apart from most other regime indexes. The main reason for 
this, according to the Economist, is that “democracy is more than the sum of its 
institutions”. Of course, these dimensions may help to capture the overall quality of 
democracy (cf. Diamond & Morlino 2005). But when they are assigned the same 
importance as free and fair elections, and political and civil rights in determining the 
existence of democracy, the result may be somewhat confusing and misguiding (Diamond 
2008, 380 fn.13). For example, due to the additive nature of the index, a country could 
compensate low values on the “electoral process” sub-index with high values on the 
“functioning of government” and “political culture” to obtain a relatively high rating on 
the overall index. Singapore is a good case in point. However, compared to the Freedom 
House’s “partly free” category, which includes a long list of clear-cut authoritarian 
regimes (e.g. Kuwait and Sierra Leone) while at the same time excluding electoral 
authoritarian regimes such as Russia, it seems to offer a considerable degree of face 
validity.  
 Table 5 relates the Economist “hybrid regime” group of countries with alternative 
indexes of political regimes. Such a comparison shows an overall good correspondence, 
but there are some discrepancies that will have to be taken into account. Among the 30 
countries classified as hybrid regimes by the Economist, four (Cambodia, Haiti, Iraq and 
Russia) were considered as “not free” by Freedom House in 2006. These four countries 
also place themselves among the five worst scores (together with Burundi) on the World 
Bank’s “Voice and accountability” indicator, which measures “the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (Kaufmann et al. 2007, 3). The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators estimates have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of 
one, and range from around –2.5 to +2.5. The mean of zero is often used as the threshold 
for democracy (Berg-Schlosser 2004; 2008). Table 5 also presents the corresponding 
scores for the rule of law situation, using another indicator from the World Bank. The 
“rule of law” indicator measures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
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abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2007, 
3). 
  
Table 5. The Economist hybrid regime category in comparison with alternative indexes 
      
 Economist 
Overall  
Score 
2006 
Freedom 
House political 
rights/civil 
liberties/status 
2006 
WGI Voice and 
accountability 
2006 
WGI Rule of 
law 
2006 
Polity IV  
2006 
      
      
      
Albania 5.91 3/3 PF –0.01 –0.70 9 
Armenia 5.89 5/4 PF –0.72 –0.52 5 
Bosnia 5.82 4/3 PF +0.18 –0.53 (–66) 
Burundi 5.82 3/5 PF –1.04 –0.96 6 
Cambodia 5.78 6/5 NF –0.98 –1.11 2 
Ecuador 5.70 3/3 PF –0.35 –0.96 7 
Ethiopia 5.68 5/5 PF –1.08 –0.64 1 
Fiji 5.67 4/3 PF –0.38 –0.37 –3 
Gambia 5.66 5/4 PF –0.90 –0.27 –5 
Georgia 5.64 3/3 PF –0.16 –0.61 7 
Ghana 5.42 1/2 F +0.37 –0.13 8 
Haiti 5.37 7/6 NF –1.11 –1.56 5 
Iraq 5.35 6/5 NF –1.54 –1.95 (–66) 
Kenya 5.28 3/3 PF –0.18 –0.98 8 
Kyrgyzstan 5.25 5/4 PF –0.70 –1.18 4 
Lebanon 5.22 5/4 PF –0.51 –0.49 7 
Liberia 5.18 4/4 PF –0.55 –0.85 6 
Madagascar 5.14 3/3 PF –0.05 –0.30 7 
Malawi 5.08 4/4 PF –0.31 –0.46 6 
Mozambique 5.02 3/4 PF  –0.06 –0.59 6 
Nicaragua 4.97 3/3 PF –0.22 –0.76 8 
Russia 4.90 6/5 NF –0.87 –0.91 7 
Senegal 4.77 2/3 F –0.05 –0.33 8 
Singapore 4.72 5/4 PF –0.07 +1.82 –2 
Tanzania 4.51 4/3 PF –0.26 –0.47 1 
Thailand 4.39 3/3 PF –0.50 +0.03 –5 
Turkey 4.19 3/3 PF –0.19 +0.08 7 
Uganda 4.15 5/4 PF –0.54 –0.50 –1 
Venezuela 4.08 4/4 PF –0.58 –1.39 5 
Zambia 4.01 4/4 PF –0.34 –0.61 5 
      
Note: F = Free, PF = Partly Free, NF = Not Free; –66 = Interruption. 
Sources: The Economist (2006); Freedom House; World Bank (2007); Polity IV (2006). 
 
The “not free” countries are also among the worst performers when it comes to the rule of 
law, with Cambodia, Iraq and Haiti at the very bottom of the list. The very poor ratings 
on the Freedom House and World Bank indicators – together with the fact that both 
countries have experienced dramatic periods of turmoil during the measured time period 
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– suggest that Cambodia, Iraq and Haiti constitute border cases that will have to be 
further scrutinized. The same is true for Russia. Although rated as “not free”, Russia is 
often put forth as a model case of a hybrid regime in the literature, and free – however 
not fair – elections have been held on a regular basis since the 1990s (McFaul 2002; 
Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002; Shevtsova 2001). 
 When consulting the Polity IV index, however, the picture becomes a bit more 
complicated. In Polity IV, Russia gets the score 7 and is accordingly classified as a 
democracy (scores from 6 to 10).8 Haiti is not far behind at a score of 5, and Cambodia at 
2, both being classified as “anocracies”.  
 Two cases in the list pull in the opposite direction. Both Ghana and Senegal are 
classified as “free” by Freedom House, and have shown a positive political development 
over the last years. They both score relatively high on the democratically important 
“electoral process” dimension in the Economist index. This is also indicated by the World 
Bank ratings. Diamond (2002) classified both countries as “electoral democracies” in 
2001, despite the fact that both countries received lower ratings by Freedom House at that 
time. Based on the Freedom House scores and three other indicators – the share of 
legislative seats held by the ruling party, the share of the vote won by the ruling party 
presidential candidate, and the years the incumbent ruler has continuously been in power 
– Diamond (2002) presents a six fold regime typology.  Democratic regimes are divided 
into two categories: “liberal democracies” (fulfilling both procedural and substantial 
democratic criteria) and “electoral democracies” (fulfilling minimum democratic criteria, 
but lacking in terms of political and civil rights).  
 About seven out of ten democracies are classified as “liberal” (scoring 2.0 or lower 
on the seven-point Freedom House scale averaging political rights and civil liberties). 31 
democracies are considered electoral but not liberal. Diamond considers 17 regimes 
“ambiguous” in the sense that they fall on the blurry boundary between electoral 
democracy and competitive authoritarianism, with independent observers disagreeing 
over how to classify them. According to Diamond, practically all 17 could be classified 
                                                 
8 The Polity index, which ranges from –10 to +10, consists of six measures that record key qualities of 
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition. It also records changes 
in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. Countries are classified in three regime categories: 
“autocracies” (–10 to –6), “anocracies” (–5 to +5) and “democracies” (+6 to +10).  
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as “competitive authoritarian”. That would raise the number of CA regimes from 21 to as 
many as 38, and the proportion from 11 to 20 percent. Another 25 regimes are defined as 
electoral authoritarian but in a more hegemonic way. Their elections and other 
“democratic” institutions are mainly façades, yet they may provide some space for 
political opposition, independent media, and social organizations that do not seriously 
criticize or challenge the regime. 
  
Table 6. Diamond’s classification of hybrid regimes in 2001 
Region Ambiguous regimes Competitive authoritarian 
regimes 
Hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian regimes 
 
Post-communist Armenia (4,4) 
Georgia (4,4) 
Macedonia (4,4) 
Ukraine (4,4) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (5,4) 
Russia (5,5) 
Belarus (6,6) 
Azerbaijan (6,5) 
Kazakhstan (6,5) 
Kyrgyzstan (6,5) 
Tajikistan (6,6) 
Uzbekistan (7,6) 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Venezuela (3,5) 
Paraguay (4,3) 
Colombia (4,4) 
Antigua & Barbuda (4,2) 
Haiti (6,6) 
 
Asia Indonesia (3,4) East Timor (5,3) 
Malaysia (5,5) 
Singapore (5,5) 
Maldives (6,5) 
Cambodia (6,5) 
Pakistan (6,5) 
Pacific Islands Fiji (4,3) 
Tonga (5,3) 
  
Africa (Sub-
Sahara) 
Mozambique (3,4) 
Tanzania (4,4) 
Nigeria (4,5) 
Djibouti (4,5) 
Sierra Leone (4,5) 
Zambia (5,4) 
Lesotho (4,4) 
Central African Rep. (4,5) 
Guinea-Bissau (4,5) 
Côte d’Ivoire (5,4) 
Gabon (5,4) 
The Gambia (5,5) 
Togo (5,5) 
Ethiopia (5,6) 
Kenya (6,5) 
Cameroon (6,6) 
Zimbabwe (6,6) 
Burkina Faso (4,4) 
Congo, Brazzaville (5,4) 
Comoros (6,4) 
Mauritania (5,5) 
Chad (6,5) 
Guinea (6,5) 
Uganda (6,5) 
Angola (6,6) 
Liberia (6,6) 
Equatorial Guinea (6,7) 
Middle East – 
North Africa 
Turkey (4,5) Lebanon (6,5) 
Iran (6,6) 
Yemen (6,6) 
Kuwait (4,5) 
Jordan (5,5) 
Morocco (5,5) 
Algeria (5,6) 
Tunisia (6,5) 
Egypt (6,6) 
N (Mean FH 
score) 
17  (4.0) 21  (5.0) 25  (5.4) 
Source: Diamond (2002). Freedom House scores for “political rights” and “civil liberties” within brackets. 
 
Finally, 25 regimes lack all traits of political competition and pluralism, and is 
accordingly labeled “politically closed authoritarian” regimes (Diamond 2002, 26, 30–
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31). Table 6 presents the countries classified as ambiguous, competitive authoritarian and 
hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. The correspondence with the Economist index 
is pretty good, although a number of differences are noticeable. Quite surprisingly, 
Diamond classifies Iran – a regime that most other classifications treat as a clear-cut case 
of autocracy – as a case of competitive authoritarianism.  
 The main problem with the indexes and classifications investigated so far is that they 
are very static in nature, capturing only a snap shot of the political development in hybrid 
regimes. The emergence and institutionalization of hybrid regimes are dynamic processes 
that might call for a more dynamic analytic approach. This is quite obvious when looking 
at different classifications from different points in time. For example, post-Soviet 
Ukraine was a hybrid regime up until the “Orange revolution” in late 2004, and has 
subsequently gone through a process of democratization, though troublesome and 
characterized by political turmoil. Slovakia and Serbia are other cases of democratizing 
hybrid regimes, countries that have gone through a transition from post-communism to 
democracy (McFaul 2005).  
 In an attempt to capture the dynamics of hybridization and de-hybridization, Levitsky 
& Way (2008) single out the trajectories of hybrid regimes in the post-Cold War period. 
They argue that hybrid regimes followed three broad patterns between 1990 and 2005 
(Table 7). The first path is democratization of a hybrid regime. Democratization entails 
the introduction and establishment of free and fair elections, protection of civil and 
political rights and a leveling of the political playing field in that no single party or 
candidate dominate access to critical state resources. The second regime outcome is 
unstable hybrid regimes, i.e. cases that have undergone one or more transitions but 
nevertheless failed to democratize. Non-democratic incumbents are removed from power, 
but the system of competitive authoritarian remains intact. Successor incumbents inherit 
the uneven playing field and the state resources that are used to weaken and disadvantage 
opponents. The third outcome is a stable hybrid regime. In these regimes the autocratic 
incumbents, or their chosen successors, remained in power. This effort has been achieved 
by the use of electoral manipulation and fraud, abuse of civil liberties and the 
preservation of the uneven playing field. 
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Table 7. Trajectories of hybrid regimes, 1990–2005 
Democratized hybrid 
regimes 
Unstable 
authoritarian/hybrid 
regimes 
Stable 
authoritarian/hybrid 
regimes 
Hybridized democracy 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Dominican Republic 
Ghana* 
Guyana 
Mali 
Mexico 
Nicaragua* 
Peru 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Taiwan 
Ukraine 
Albania* 
Belarus 
Benin 
Georgia* 
Haiti* 
Kenya* 
Madagascar* 
Macedonia 
Malawi* 
Moldova 
Senegal* 
Zambia* 
 
Armenia* 
Cambodia* 
Cameroon 
Ethiopia* 
Gabon 
Malaysia 
Mozambique* 
Russia* 
Tanzania* 
Zimbabwe 
 
Venezuela* 
(Peru under Fujimori) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Table 1.2 in Levitsky & Way (2008), 82. 
* Classified as hybrid regime in the Economist Index of Democracy 2006. 
 
I would argue that it would be appropriate to add another path of regime change to 
Levitsky and Way’s three trajectories. They do not take into consideration that 
hybridization might also be an outcome of democratic decay.9 The political development 
in Venezuela is an interesting case in point (cf. Buxton 1999), where the democratic 
institutions, though unstable and flawed in many ways, have been weakened by 
constitutional means and the political playing field has become increasingly uneven 
during Hugo Chavez presidency (cf. Ottaway 2003). Venezuela could thus be considered 
a somewhat unique case of transition to democracy, and then from democracy to 
competitive authoritarianism. Peru could constitute another example, which transformed 
into a hybrid regime during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). After the 
ousting of Fujimori, Peru once again embarked on a process of democratization, which 
makes the country a case of democratized hybrid regime. The list of countries in Table 7 
implies that the “the third wave of democratization” was more or less a closed chapter 
after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/90. Thus, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War triggered a wave of 
hybridization rather than democratization (cf. McFaul 2002).  
                                                 
9 In their 2002 article, Levitsky and Way briefly discuss this path, but do not elaborate on this issue in their 
forthcoming book.  
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 Levitsky and Way’s definition and classification seems to be the most fruitful so far. 
It is based on qualitative judgments about the development in the individual countries, 
strengthening the reliability and validity of the classification. In addition, it also takes 
into account the dynamics of regime change and stability in hybrid regimes, making it a 
more useful analytical tool than for example the static Economist index, which is nothing 
more than just a snapshot in time based on a wide array of quantitative indicators from 
different sources. If we are interested in the emergence and performance of different 
types of political regimes, the time factor is of obvious importance. In quantitative 
analyses this is often problematic due to the nature of available data. Often, comparative 
cross-country data are only available for one or a few points in time, such as the 
Economist democracy index or the World Values Survey. If our purpose is to study the 
dynamics and trajectories of different types of regimes, we need time series data. A 
classification such as Levitsky and Way’s makes a useful starting point for further data 
collection. 
 
The emergence and survival of hybrid regimes: Moving beyond 
transitology? 
What factors contribute to the recent trend of hybridization of political regimes? And 
what are the prospects for hybrid regimes to democratize? Since these questions could be 
seen as issues of political transformation and regime change, it might seem natural to 
look toward theories of regime transition and democratization for guidance. However, 
making the observation that a substantial number of “third wave democracies” or 
“transitional democracies” in fact never became democracies implies that the theoretical 
outlook of the “transition paradigm” might not be very helpful when it comes to 
explaining hybrid regimes (cf. Carothers 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002; Ottaway 2003).  
 It is important to not that democratization theory is not a coherent school of thought, 
but could traditionally be said to consist of at least three broad perspectives, each 
emphasizing different causal explanatory factors. During the 1960s and 1970s, theories 
focused on social structures (cf. Lipset 1959; Almond & Verba 1963). The structural 
modernization paradigm was called into question when “underdeveloped” dictatorships 
in Latin America democratized in the 1980s. Eventually, the spread of multiparty 
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elections to Africa in the 1990s meant more or less the burial of the structural school. 
Drawing on the work by the early forerunners Rustow (1970) and Linz (1978), a new 
generation of scholars began to emphasize the importance of human agency in 
democratization processes (cf. O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991). The 
rationality of political actors and their ability to negotiate and form pacts were perceived 
as the central factors that could explain democratization in Southern Europe and Latin 
America. Thus, democracy was seen as the outcome of political actors rather than some 
superstructure, or the effect of certain necessary societal structures. During the 1990s, 
another scholarly branch investigated the role of constitutional and institutional design in 
democratic transition and consolidation (cf. Linz 1990; Sartori 1994; Lijphart & 
Waisman 1996). Although emphasizing different factors in their explanations of 
democratization, this generation of scholars echoed the structuralists’ strict focus on 
domestic factors (cf. Linde & Ekman 2006).  
 So, why do hybrid regimes come into existence? Are the reasons to be found in the 
structures of society, or is it because of bad leaders, badly designed constitutions and 
institutions or an underdeveloped and disorganized civil society? Recent research on 
hybrid regimes has in general come to denounce the explanations proposed in 
democratization studies and transitology. One of the main reasons is that the narrow 
domestic focus that has dominated the research agenda cannot account for the 
hybridization of political regimes in the post-Cold War era (cf. Carothers 2002; Levitsky 
& Way 2002; 2008). Another motivation to look beyond the transitions paradigm stems 
from its implicit tendency to view transitions from authoritarian rule as going toward 
democracy. The proliferation of hybrid regimes indicates a need to reconsider a shift 
from studying politics through the prism of democracy (Snyder 2006, 219). 
 
Hybridization and the international context 
One possible starting point is to consider the strand of research that in the 1990s started to 
analyze the explanatory power of the international context and international factors when 
it comes to explain success and failure in the third wave of democratization. Scholars 
such as Pridham (1991; Pridham et al. 1997) and Whitehead (1996) argue that 
democratization cannot be explained without taking the international environment into 
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account.10 However, despite the growing interest in various external forces, the 
relationship between the international environment and regime change remains poorly 
understood. The most obvious problem is the very few attempts to construct coherent 
theories building on the many factors and mechanisms listen in the literature. Moreover, 
Levitsky and Way (2008) argue that most studies have failed to account for the fact that 
the importance of the international context varies substantially across cases and regions. 
Drawing on these observations, Levitsky and Way (2005; 2006; 2008) integrate the 
mechanisms of international influence highlighted in earlier research into a single 
theoretical framework, consisting of two dimensions: Western leverage and linkage to the 
West. To a large extent, this endeavor brings together important knowledge from both 
democratization theory and the growing body of literature on democracy promotion. 
 
Western leverage 
Leverage is defined as governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. 
International, i.e. Western, actors may use leverage in different ways, including political 
and economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military intervention. Leverage is 
determined by three factors. The first – and perhaps the most important – one is the raw 
size and military and economic strength. The argument is that weak states with small 
economies dependent on aid are more vulnerable to external pressure than strong states 
with substantial military and/or economic power. The second factor is the existence of 
competing issues on Western countries’ policy agendas. In countries where Western 
governments have important interests at stake (e.g. the Middle East), leverage may be 
limited and accordingly these regimes will be less vulnerable to external pressure. 
Finally, the degree of Western leverage is reduced by the existence of regional powers 
that provide crucial economic and/or military support to autocratic rulers. For example, 
Russian support to the rulers in Belarus and Ukraine, and South African backing of 
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe has played an important part for those countries non-
democratic development. On the contrary, in Central Europe and the Americas, the 
                                                 
10 For a short overview of research on the international context and democratization, see Uhlin’s chapter in 
Linde & Ekman (2006). 
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absence of an alternative power left the EU and the US as the only option, which favored 
democratization (Levitsky & Way 2008).  
 With leverage the cost of repression, electoral fraud and other government abuses 
increases. Leverage alone is rarely sufficient to bring democratization, however. Western 
pressure has been inconsistent and often ineffective. The instrument of political 
conditionality seems to be of only minor importance in efforts to achieve more than 
incomplete democratization. The enlargement process of the European Union is an 
exception, where political conditionality – in terms of the Copenhagen criteria – proved 
successful. Perhaps colored by the assumptions of transitology, international actors came 
to focus heavily on elections, thus to a large extent overlooking necessary democratic 
components such as civil liberties and free media.   
 
Countries often slipped out of the Western spotlight once elections had been held, even when 
elections failed to bring democracy (as in Zambia, Kenya, and Peru during the 1990s). As a 
consequence, although blatantly authoritarian acts such as military coups or the cancellation of 
elections often triggered strong international reactions during the post–Cold War period, 
Western pressure routinely failed to deter more subtle abuses of power, including government 
control and manipulation of the media, harassment of the opposition, and significant levels of 
electoral fraud (Levitsky & Way 2005, 22). 
 
Thus, leverage alone was often effective in bringing about transitions from autocracy to 
competitive authoritarianism by introducing multiparty elections, but it was very rarely a 
sufficient factor fostering deeper democratization and consolidation of new democracies. 
It should be noted, however, that recent research on African regime transitions has shown 
that the holding of election in itself is an important democratizing factor: 
 
While this research does not suggest that elections are the only or even the principal causal 
factor behind democratization, it shows that the repeated holding of elections in new electoral 
regimes promotes and breeds democratic qualities: The more successive elections, the more 
democratic a nation becomes (Lindberg 2006, 148–149). 
 
Findings like these suggest that it might be too hasty to dismiss the positive effect of 
leverage in terms of political conditionality in the long run. However, in order to be 
democratic, elections have to be regular and fair events, and the importance of elections 
are supposedly even greater if Western countries do not let transitional states out of their 
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sight after having held only founding elections. In order to contribute to a deepening and 
consolidation of democracy, conditionality has to be a long term commitment. 
“Democratic quality tends to improve with third and following elections (Lindberg 2004, 
86). Such findings also indicate that it might be too hasty to write off the importance of 
constitutional and institutional aspects emphasized by the research of democratic 
transition and consolidation (cf. Fish 2006). 
 
Linkage to the west 
Leverage is most effective when combined with extensive linkage to the West. Here, 
linkage means the density of economic, political, diplomatic, social and organizational 
ties and cross-border flows between a country and the EU, the US and Western-
dominated international organizations. They list five dimensions of such linkage: 1) 
economic linkage; 2) geopolitical linkage (ties to Western governments, alliances and 
organizations); 3) social linkage (tourism, migration, elite education in the West etc.); 4) 
communication linkage (Internet, telecommunications, access to Western media etc.); and 
5) civil society linkage (ties to international NGOs, party organizations and other Western 
networks) (Levitsky & Way 2005, 22–23). 
 Of course, linkage is not only an “intentional” issue. It is rooted in a variety of 
factors, such as level of economic development, capitalist economy, and colonial history. 
It has been argued that the most important source of linkage is geographical proximity, 
because it brings on interdependence between countries. Taking into consideration the 
route of “third wave democracies”, there seems to be a strong correlation between 
successful democratization and closeness to the EU and the US. In the last decades, 
linkage contributed to democratization and raised the cost of authoritarianism in several 
ways. It heightened the international recognition and the cost of authoritarian abuse. 
Linkage also increased the probability of an international response to such abuse. It 
created new domestic constituencies for democratic norm-abiding behavior and reshaped 
the balance of power in strengthening democratic forces and weakening and isolating 
autocrats (Levitsky & Way 2005, 23; 2008, 32). Where linkage has been low, the global 
democratic “Zeitgeist” spawned by the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War 
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has in many cases meant improved conditions for authoritarian rulers to legitimize their 
hold on power through the means of “free” elections.  
 These two factors – leverage and linkage – are the crucial components in Levitsky 
and Way’s causal theory of the emergence of hybrid regimes, or competitive 
authoritarianism as they prefer to call it. The main argument boils down to the fact that 
different combinations and levels of leverage and linkage produced different outcomes of 
regime transitions. The empirical evidence provided so far could be more convincing. 
Investigating the explanatory power of leverage and linkage, and most important the 
combination of these factors, in a systematic and comparative way is an important task 
for future research. Both linkage and leverage are possible to operationalize and measure 
statistically through a number of available data sources, for example the Quality of 
Government dataset. Data sources like the QoG dataset also make it possible to 
investigate these questions in a more dynamic manner, thanks to the extensive coverage 
both in space and time. Of course, the possibility to control for other potential 
explanatory factors, such as different domestic variables discussed in the literature, 
should also provide a tougher test of the theory. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The last decades, one of the main global trends has been the hybridization of political 
regimes. A majority of the countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, Eurasia and Asia that 
embarked on transitions from different types of autocratic rule in the 1990s did not 
transform into democracies, but to other types of authoritarian rule. Many of them 
embrace the form of democracy with multiparty elections, but reject essential democratic 
ideas such as fairness, respect for civil and political rights, free media and the rule of law.  
On top of this, they often display an impressively bad track record when it comes to 
quality of government. These hybrid regimes constitute an interesting challenge for 
comparative politics, and especially for scholars within democratization studies. 
Conceptually, some consensus seems to have emerged among scholars that these regimes 
should not be treated as “transitional democracies” or democracies with different types of 
shortcomings. Rather, they are a new form of authoritarian rule.  
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 The growth of hybrid regimes gives rise to some intriguing challenges for scholars 
and policymakers alike. What are the main factors behind the trend of hybridization? 
What are the effects of hybrid regimes when it comes to quality of government? What 
measures should and should not be taken when engaging in democracy promotion in 
hybrid regimes? 
 When it comes to explanations of hybrid regimes, there is much to be done. One 
important issue concerns the value of resent research on democratization, i.e. democratic 
transition and consolidation. Although recent research on hybrid regimes emphasizes 
external factors to a much larger extent than democratization theory, many contributions 
to the literature have in fact focused on domestic factors, such as elections and 
manipulation, strategies of incumbents and opposition, state strength and constitutional 
and institutional design. Despite the rhetoric, similarities to the transition paradigm are 
not hard to find. Existing works on the importance of political actors (incumbents and 
opposition) in hybrid regimes come close to the classics of transitology in their emphasis 
of incumbent strategies and splits within the regime and opposition. As noted earlier, 
most works have been qualitative analyses of one or a few cases. Thus, the most 
innovative component is to be found in the fields’ critique of the democratic bias that has 
prevailed within transitology. This is a very important point, however. It is necessary for 
understanding the nature of the hybrid regime as a distinct regime type.   
 Furthermore, the geographical and cultural diversity of hybrid regimes calls for cross-
regional comparative analyses. The bulk of comparative works on democratization has 
focused on comparisons between countries within the same geographical region, such as 
Central Europe, South Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. These studies have 
often applied “most similar systems” designs, seeking to explain different outcomes in a 
small number of countries with similar backgrounds. Explanations of the wide variety of 
hybrid regimes call for different approaches. The availability of cross-national data today 
should hopefully encourage scholars to employ extensive comparative research designs 
than has been the case in transition and consolidation studies.  
  
 
 
 24
References 
Alvarez, Michael, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi & Adam Przeworski (1996), 
“Classifying Political Regimes”, Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (2): 3–
36. 
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (2004), “The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current 
Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance”, Journal of Communist Studies and 
Transition Politics 20 (1): 28–55. 
Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (2008), “Determinants of Democratic Successes and Failures in Africa”, 
European Journal of Political Research 47 (3): 269–306. 
Brooker, Paul (2002), Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Buxton, Julia (1999), “Venezuela: Degenerative Democracy”, Democratization 6 (1): 247–270. 
Carothers, Thomas (2002), “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 
5–21. 
Case, William (2006), “Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?”, in 
Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Collier, David & Robert Adcock (1999), “Democracy and Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach 
to Choices about Concepts”, Annual Review of Political Science 2: 537–565. 
Collier, David & Steven Levitsky (1997), “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in 
Comparative Research”, World Politics 49, 430–451. 
Diamond, Larry (1999), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore & London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Diamond, Larry (2002), “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35.  
Diamond, Larry (2005), “The State of Democratization at the Beginning of the 21st Century”, The 
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 11 (1): 13–18. 
Diamond, Larry (2008), The Spirit of Democracy. The Struggle to Build Free Societies 
Throughout the World. New York: Times Books. 
Diamond, Larry & Leonardo Morlino, eds. (2005), Assessing the Quality of Democracy. 
Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Economist (2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. Online: 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_index_2007_v3.pdf .  
Elkins, Zachary (2000), “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative 
Conceptualizations”, American Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 287–294.  
Fish, Steven M. (2006), “Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the 
Electoral Arena”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of 
Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Freedom House (2008), Freedom in the World 2008 (www.freedomhouse.org). 
Guliyev, Farid (2005), “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? 
An Attempt at Conceptualization”, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratization 13 (3): 393–436. 
Hadenius, Axel & Jan Teorell (2005), “Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: 
Reassessing Recent Evidence”, Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (4): 87–
106. 
Hartlyn, Jonathan & Jennifer McCoy (2006), “Observer Paradoxes: How to Assess Electoral 
Manipulation”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
 25
Jayasuriya, Kanishka & Garry Rodan (2007), “New Trajectories for Political Regimes in 
Southeast Asia”, Democratization 14 (5):767–772. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi (2007), “Governance Matters IV: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006”. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4280, July 2007. 
Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2002), “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal 
of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. 
Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2005), “International Linkage and Democratization”, Journal 
of Democracy 16 (3): 20–34. 
Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2006), “Linkage and Leverage: How Do International Factors 
Change Balances of Power?”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The 
Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Levitsky, Steven & Lucan A. Way (2008, forthcoming), Competitive Authoritarianism: The 
Emergence and Dynamics of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era. Unpublished book 
manuscript.  
Online: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/comparative.speaker.series/files/levitsky_with_bib.pdf 
Lijphart, Arend & Carlos H. Waisman, eds. (1996), Institutional Design in New Democracies: 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.  
Lindberg, Staffan I. (2004), “The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, 
Competition and Legitimacy in Africa”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 41 (3): 
61–105. 
Lindberg, Staffan I. (2006), “The Surprising Significance of African Elections”, Journal of 
Democracy 17 (1): 139–151. 
Linde, Jonas & Joakim Ekman (2006), Demokratiseringsprocesser. Teoretiska ansatser och 
empiriska studier. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Linz, Juan J. (1964) ‘An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain’, in Erik Allardt and Yrjö 
Littunen, eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Transactions of the 
Westermarck Society.  
Linz, Juan J. (1978), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-
Equilibrium. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Linz, Juan J. (1990), “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy 1 (1): 51–69. 
Linz, Juan J. (2000), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1959), “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 
and Political Legitimacy”, American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105. 
McFaul, Michael (2002), “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Postcommunist World”, World Politics 54: 212–244. 
McFaul, Michael (2005), “Transitions from Postcommunism”, Journal of Democracy 16 (3): 5–
19. 
Munck, Gerardo L. (2006), “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime 
Categories”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Munck, Gerardo L. & Richard Snyder (2004), “How the Concepts We Use and the Way We 
Measure Them Shape the World We See”, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo & Philippe C. Schmitter (1986), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press.  
Ottaway, Marina (2003), Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. 
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Pridham, Geoffrey (1991), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime 
Transition in Southern Europe. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 
 26
 27
Pridham, Geoffrey, Eric Herring & George Sanford, eds. (1997), Building Democracy? The 
International Dimension in Eastern Europe. London: Leicester University Press.  
Przeworski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antoni Cheibub & Fernando Limongi (2000), 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reich, Gary (2002), “Categorizing Political Regimes: New Data for Old Problems”, 
Democratization 9 (4): 1–24. 
Rustow, Dankwart (1979), “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative 
Politics 2 (3): 337–363. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1994), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes. New York: New York University Press. 
Schedler, Andreas, ed. (2006a), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Schedler, Andreas (2006b), “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Shevtsova, Lilia (2001), “Russia’s Hybrid Regime”, Journal of Democracy 12 (4): 65–70. 
Snyder, Richard (2006), “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Nondemocratic 
Regimes”, in Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree 
Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Way, Lucan (2002), “Pluralism by Default in Moldova”, Journal of Democracy 13 (4): 127–141. 
Way, Lucan (2005), “Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy 16 (2): 131–
145.  
Whitehead, Laurence (1996), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the 
Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wigell, Mikael (2008), “Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in 
Comparative Politics”, Democratization 15 (2): 230–250. 
 
